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ABSTRACT

With the signing of the Oslo 1T Accord** at the White
House on September 28, 1995, Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization codified the expansion of Palestinian
self-rule in Judea and Samaria. Authors of this Accord argue
that the security risks to Israelfrom the nascent Palestinian
state could be reduced through appropriate forms of
demilitarization. Similar arguments are being offered in
relation to the Golan Heights, a strategicplateau currently in
dispute between Israel and Syria. In this very timely and
important Article, Professor Beres and Ambassador Shoval
examine demilitarization in both contexts. They conclude,

*
B.A. Queens College (1967); MA., Princeton (1969); Ph.D., Princeton,
1971. Dr. Beres, Professor of International Law at Purdue University, is the
author of many books and articles dealing with Israel and international law.

**
Israel's former ambassador to the United States. Ambassador Shoval
is presently Head of Foreign Affairs for the Likud Party. He holds an advanced
degree in Political Science from the Graduate Institute of International Relations,
Geneva.
*** Oslo II was signed at the White House on September 28, 1995. Oslo I
was signed at the same venue on September 13, 1993. Together, they comprise

the core of what has generally been described as the "Middle East Peace Process."
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jurisprudentialassurancesnotwithstanding, that Israel would
face substantial dangersfrom a demilitarized "Palestine"and
from a demilitarized Golan.
The authors begin by discussing the hidden dangers to
Israel of entering into an agreement that would create a
demilitarized, independent Palestinian state. The authors
argue, inter alia, that a demilitarized Palestine would be

vulnerable to attacks from militant Islamic factions from
within and outside its borders. Under such circumstances,
the new Palestiniangovernment could be within its rights,
under international law, to disregard any demilitarization
agreement. In the end, the authors argue, the newly formed
Palestiniangovernment could even be forced to ask Israel to
reenter and defend Palestine, ironically embroiling Israel in a
potentially catastrophicwar.
Professor Beres and Ambassador Shoval also discuss
the Israeli government's announced willingness to consider
withdrawal of its troopsfrom the Golan Heights. The authors
argue that such a withdrawal could be disastrous to the
security of Israel. By transferringthe Golan to Syria, Israel
would be sacrificing a crucial early-warning and defense
posture to any future Syrian attack. The authors conclude
that, in order to secure the safety of the Jewish state, the
government of Israel must avoid placing faith in any
demilitarizationagreements that would require the surrender
of strategicallyimportantIsraeli territory to enemies of Israel.
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I. WHY A DEMILITARIZED PALESTINIAN "ENTITY" WOULD NOT REMAIN
DEMILITARIZED

Now that an agreement on expanding Palestinian autonomy
is being implemented,1 attention will be focused on the alleged

1.
Some pertinent background documents to the Oslo I Agreement
(September 13, 1993) include: Palestine Partition Plan, G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N.
GAOR, 2d Sess., at 131, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947); G.A. Res. 194(111), 3 U.N.
GAOR, pt. 1, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d
Sess., 1382d mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1967); Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Working Paper, Fundamental Principles (The Rogers Plan, October 28, 1969), in
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advantages, for Israel, of demilitarization. Would a demilitarized
Palestinian "entity" located in Judea/Samaria (West Bank) and

Gaza represent a serious security threat to Israel? Not at all, say

supporters of this remedy to a seemingly endless intercommunal
conflict. Surely, argue proponents of this position, such an entity
would likely be the weakest military force on earth.
From a purely tactical and political perspective, the fragility
of this argument is well-known.
The hidden dangers of
demilitarization are clear and compelling. As a Palestinian entity
emerges in these lands, its threat to the Jewish state will lie not
only in the presence or absence of a national armed force, but
also in the many other Arab/Islamic armies and terrorists 2 that
will inevitably compete for power in the newly organized state.
But there is another reason why a demilitarized nucleus of
"Palestine" would present Israel with a substantial security threat:
international law would not necessarily require Palestinian
compliance with agreements concerning armed force. From the
standpoint of international law, enforcing demilitarization upon
any form of a sovereign Palestine would be problematic. As an
aautonomous" entity, Palestine might not be bound by any
preindependence compacts, even if these agreements included
U.S. guarantees. Because treaties can be binding only upon
states,3 an agreement between a nonstate Palestinian Liberation

INSTIUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES,

PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI

PEACE AGREEMENt. A

DOCUMENTARY RECORD (1994); S.C. Res. 338, U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1747th
mtg., at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 (1973).
2.
Terrorism is a "conglomerate" crime under international law. For
current conventions in force on this crime, see Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1037 U.N.T.S. 167; Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 18,
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Convention on Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704
U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T.
564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1151; International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
11,081, 18 I.L.M. 1456; and European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, opened for signature,Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90, 15 I.L.M. 1272
(entered into force Aug. 4, 1978).
3.
A treaty is always an international agreement "concluded between
states...." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(1)(a),
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. For the
requirements of statehood under international law, see Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
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Organization (P.L.O.)4 and one or more states would have no real
5
authority and little real effectiveness.
But what if the government of an emergent Palestine were
willing to consider itself bound by the prestate, nontreaty

agreement (i.e., were willing to treat this agreement as if it were
an authentic treaty)?
Even in these relatively favorable
circumstances, the new government would have ample pretext to
identify various grounds for lawful treaty termination. It could,

for example, withdraw from the "treaty" because of what it
regards as a "material breach," a violation by any of the other
state parties that undermines the object or purpose of the treaty.
Or it could point toward what international law calls a
"fundamental change of circumstances" (rebus sic stantibus).6 In
this connection, if a small but expanding Palestine declares itself
vulnerable to previously unforeseen dangers-perhaps from the
forces of other Arab armies-it could lawfully end its codified
commitment to remain demilitarized.
There is another method by which a treaty-like arrangement
obligating a new Palestinian entity to accept demilitarization could
quickly and legally be invalidated after independence. The usual

4.
See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, supra note 3, art.
1. See generally Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y.
In seeking a favorable
1990) (discussing the P.L.O.'s status as a state).
classification for litigation in Klinghoffer, the P.L.O. requested that the court
accept its self-description as a state. Id. at 858. More precisely, the P.L.O.
characterized itself as "the nationhood and sovereignty of the Palestinian people .... "
Id. at 857. The court, however, found the P.L.O. to be an "unincorporated
association." Id. at 858. It determined that the P.L.O. lacked the key elements of
statehood as articulated by long-settled norms of international law. Id. (citing
National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M.T. Stolt Sheaf, 860 F. 2d 551, 553 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1091 (1989) and quoting RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES, § 201 (1987)).
5.
Technically, an agreement on demilitarization under international law
must always be "between states." Hence, any agreement on demilitarization that
would include a nonstate party would be primafadenull and void. See, e.g., Karl
Liko, DemilitarizedZone, in 2 INTERNAIONAL MILITARY AND DEFENSE ENCYCLOPEDIA

736, 736 (Trevor N. Dupuy ed., 1993) (defining "demilitarized zone" as "a term
used in international law to designate an area in which, according to a formal
treaty or an informal agreement between states, the maintenance of military
forces and installations is prohibited." (emphasis added)).
6.
Defined literally as "so long as conditions remain the same," the
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has a long history. For an informed scholarly
treatment of this doctrine, see generally ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY
In the traditional view, the obligation of a treaty
TERMINATION 3-55 (1975).
terminates when a change occurs in those circumstances that existed at the
effective date of the agreement and the continuance of which formed a tacit
condition of the on-going validity of the treaty. Id. The function of the doctrine
therefore is to execute the shared intentions of the parties. Id. Rebus sic
stantibus becomes operative when there is a change in the circumstances that
formed the cause, motive, or rationale of consent. Id.
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grounds that may be invoked under domestic law to invalidate
contracts also apply under international law to treaties. This
means that the new Palestinian state could point to errors of fact
or to duress as perfectly appropriate grounds for terminating the
agreement.
Moreover, any treaty is void if, at the time it was entered into,
it conflicted with a "peremptory" rule of general international law
(jus cogens)-a rule accepted and recognized by the international
community of states as one from which "no derogation is
permitted." 7 Because the right of sovereign states to maintain
military forces essential to "self defense"8 is certainly such a
peremptory rule, 9 Palestine, depending upon its particular form
of authority, could be entirely within its right to abrogate any
treaty that had compelled its demilitarization.
Thomas Jefferson, an early President of the United States
who had read Epicurus, Cicero, and Seneca, as well as Voltaire,
Montesquieu, Holbach, Helvetius, and Beccaria (and who became
something of a philosophe himself), wrote the following about
obligation and international law:
The Moral duties which exist between individual and individual
in a state of nature, accompany them into a state of society & the
aggregate of the duties of all the individuals composing the society
constitutes the duties of that society towards any other, so that
between society & society the same moral duties exist as did
between the individuals composing them while in an unassociated
state, their maker not having released them from those duties on
their forming themselves into a nation. Compacts then between
nation & nation are obligatory on them by the same moral law
which obliges individuals to observe their compacts. There are
circumstances however which sometimes excuse the non-

7.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 53. Even a treaty is
subordinate to peremptory expectations: "A treaty is void if, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law." Id.
8.
This right extends to both the customary right of anticipatory selfdefense and to the codified right of post-attack self-defense. Regarding the right

of anticipatory self-defense, states do not always have to wait until after an attack
is absorbed before embarking upon self-defense. See infra note 44 (anticipatory
self defense). Rather, where the threat is sufficiently imminent in point of time,
they can choose to strike first, provided, of course, that the strike is within the
parameters of discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity.
Id.
Regarding the codified right of post-attack self-defense, see U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
9.
One theory is that any treaty obligation may be terminated unilaterally
following changes in conditions that make performance of the treaty injurious to
fundamental rights, especially the rights of existence, self-preservation, and
independence. Some areas of law summarize these rights as "rights of necessity."
See DAVID, supranote 6, at 19. See generally LAW OF TREATES, art. 28 Doctrine
section, in 29 AM. J. INTL L. 653, 1100-02 (Supp. 1935) (presenting the doctrinal
background for article 28, entitled "Rebus Sic Stantibus," in this draft convention
prepared for the codification of international law).
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performance of contracts between man & man: so are there also
between nation & nation. When performance, for instance,
becomes impossible, non-performance is not immoral.
So if
performance becomes self-destructive to the party, the10 law of selfpreservation overrules the laws of obligation to others.

Here

it

must

also

be

remembered

that,

historically,

demilitarization is a principle applied to various "zones,"11 not to
the entirety of still-emergent states. 12 Hence, a new state of
Palestine might have yet another legal ground upon which to
evade compliance with preindependence commitments to
demilitarization.
It could be alleged, inter alia, that these
commitments are inconsistent with traditional bases of
authoritative international law-bases found in treaties and
conventions, international custom, and the general principles of

10. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the French Treaties (April 28, 1793), in THE
POLrITCAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113-14 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1993).
Later, Jefferson concludes:
As every treaty ought to be made by a sufficient power, a treaty pernicious
to the state is null, & not at all obligatory; no governor of a nation having
power to engage things capable of destroying the state, for the safety of
which the empire is trusted to him. The nation itself, bound necessarily to
whatever its preservation & safety require, cannot enter into engagements
contrary to it's [sic] indispensable obligations.
Id. at 115.
11.
For a source containing detailed provisions on demilitarized zones, see
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (Protocol I).
12.
Examples of demilitarized zones appear throughout history. See Liko,
supra note 5, at 736-37. In 348 B.C., a treaty between Rome and Carthage
included a provision for neutralization of Corsica, a neutral zone "in the middle."
Id. ("Corsica esset media interRomanos et Carthaginienses."). The Treaty of Radzin
in 1681 between the Russian and Ottoman empires created a vast buffer zone
between both parties south of Kiev.
Id. at 737.
More modem forms of
demilitarization were developed in the 19th century from measures that
prohibited fortifications in designated areas, normally imposed by the victor upon
the vanquished. Id. After World War I, as a consequence of the Versailles Treaty,
Germany had to demilitarize the Rhineland. Id. Permanent demilitarized zones

have been created in the Straits of Magellan (by the border treaty of 1881 between
Argentina and Chile); in the Aaland Islands belonging to Finland (according to
the Aaland Islands Convention of 1921 between Finland, Sweden, and other
European powers); and in Norway's Svalbard Archipelago and Bear Island (by
terms of the Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty of 1920 between a number of states,
including Norway, the United States, and the former Soviet Union). Id. The Outer
Space Treaty of 27 January 1967 demilitarized the moon and other celestial
bodies (prohibiting the stationing and the testing of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction). Id. Antarctica was demilitarized by the Antarctic
Treaty of 1 December 1959. Id.
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law recognized by "civilized nations," 1 3-and
are commitments of no binding character.

that therefore they

It follows from all this that Israel should take little comfort
from the legal promise of Palestinian demilitarization, whether in
Gaza/Jericho or in the territories generally. 14 Indeed, should the
government of a Palestinian entity choose to invite foreign armies
or terrorists onto its territory (possibly after the original
government authority is displaced or overthrown by more
militantly Islamic, anti-Israel forces), it could do so without
violating
and
without
necessarily
practical
difficulties
international law. Ironically, if the original P.L.O. government of
Palestine perceived a threat of aggression' s from outside Arab
forces, demilitarization could result in Palestine inviting Israel to
protect the new Arab state from mutual enemies.
The prospect of such an invitation is not as strange as it
seems. Because acceptance of such an invitation could likely be
perceived by Israel as being in its own best interests, Jerusalem's
requested military involvement in "Palestine" could likely occur.
Significantly, this involvement could bring Israel into a much
wider and potentially catastrophic war, which is exactly the
intolerably dangerous kind of condition that a demilitarized
Palestinian entity would be intended to prevent in the first place.
If such an outcome results from the Israeli attempt to stabilize a
new and demilitarized Arab neighbor, it would add yet another
irony to the tragedy, a tragedy based in part upon a
misunderstanding of pertinent international law. In the final
analysis, of course, the overriding danger to Israel of Palestinian
demilitarization is more practical than jurisprudential and stems
from Israel's self-inflicted abrogation of its own critical security
role in essential territories.

13.
These authoritative bases of international law are drawn, of course,
from Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
14.
A related demilitarization issue, as this article will now demonstrate,
concerns disposition of the Golan. Israel could decide to return the strategically
important heights on condition of Syrian demilitarization. Here the legal meaning
of "demilitarization" would be more traditional than in its use regarding
concessions by a still nonexistent state (Palestine), but the consequences of a
Golan demilitarization could be no less injurious to Israel.
15.
See Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprintedin 13
I.L.M. 710 (1974).
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WHY GOLAN DEMILITARIZATION WOULD NOT WORK

The Rabin government is currently considering a withdrawal
from the Golan Heights in order to reach a peace agreement with
Syria.16 Such a withdrawal, from an area less than one percent
of Syria's total size, would leave the northern region of Israel open
to Syrian, Iraqi, or Iranian invasions through the Jordan Valley. 17
Moreover, such a withdrawal would destroy and uproot thirty-two
Golan Jewish communities and threaten a third of Israel's water
18
supply.
Leaving aside the importance of the Golan in Jewish
history, 19 the immediate issue is one of security.
In this
connection, a number of remedies are proposed to compensate
Israel for "returning" the Golan to Syria, such as providing Israel
with a broad variety of technical means, with U.S. military
presence in the area, or both. Thus, the quid pro quo for Israel
here is, in essence, a demilitarization of the plateau, which is
roughly the size of New York City's borough of Queens. The
problem with such demilitarization, as with the previously
discussed demilitarization proposals for a Palestinian state, is
that it would not work.
Unlike the problem of Palestinian
demilitarization, however, the issue here has nothing to do with
the transforming "legal personality"2 0 of one of the parties (as
states, both parties to a Golan withdrawal agreement would, of
course, possess full legal personality), but rather with more
traditional concerns over the obligations of "good faith" (pacta

16.
Before the general election in 1992, Yitzhak Rabin said, "It is
inconceivable that we withdraw from the Golan Heights even in peace. [Anyone]
who considers withdrawing from the Golan Heights forsakes the security of
Israel." See GOLAN SETI=MENTS COMMMTEE, THE GOLAN COMMUNMES 2 (May 1994)
(local publication from Qazrin, Israel; copy on file with authors).
17.
Id.
18.
Id. (section entitled "Security * Water * Communities").
19.
For a very complete discussion of the historically Jewish character of
the Golan, see Erich Isaac, The Golan in Jewish History, OUTPOS, June 1995, at
3. In the course of recorded history, more than 60 assaults on the Land of Israel
west of the Jordan were launched from, or through, the Golan. Id. The Golan,
the name of a town in the Bashan (today Sahm el Jaulan), was a part of the
"Promised Land" divided among Gad, Reuben, and the half-tribe of Menasseh. Id.
at 4.
20.
Legal personality is the authoritative capacity that accompanies
certain entitlements and obligations under international law. See Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States, supranote 3 (concerning the status of states as
international persons, and setting forth, as the name indicates, some of the rights
and duties of states). Such personality is a property of states and of certain
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and corporations
within a state. See, e.g., Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 (stating that
the "United Nations shall possess juridical personality").
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sunt servanda)2 1 and associated issues of enforcement. Further,
the problem of Golan demilitarization stems, in part, from the
predictable shortcomings of international guarantees in a world
idea of an "international community" is selfwhere the very
22
contradictory.
A Golan agreement with Syria could permit Israel to operate
its essential early-warning stations. Syria has repeatedly objected
to this, but, in any case, these facilities would not be an adequate
substitute for an effective defense. Moreover, in order to get such
permission, Syria might be offered certain reciprocal ground
station opportunities. 2 3 Indeed, in July 1995, Prime Minister
stations of their own within pre-1967
Rabin offered the Syrians
24
Israel as compensation.
For real security, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) must retain
its positions on the Golan for constant surveillance of the Syrian
army. 25 Pre-1967 warning stations do not have a clear line of
Not surprisingly, a large
sight deep into Syrian territory.2 6
number of former Israeli intelligence officers, regardless of party
affiliation, oppose any Israeli dependence upon third parties for
information concerned with survival decisions. 2 7 A demilitarized
Golan with early warning based upon an expanded United States
role or even the most technologically advanced systems, including
satellites, or both, would not be enough. 28 In the event of a
warning failure, which is always possible (e.g., the 1973 Yom
Kippur aggression), Syrian tanks might proceed into Israel
29
unopposed.
What about U.S. troops on a demilitarized Golan? Stationed
in a very small area, such deployment would likely place U.S.
troops in grave danger from well-armed terrorists and proxies of

21.

See Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 26 ("Pacta Sunt Servanda:

Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by

them in good faith.").
22.

Consider, for example, the reactions of the "international community"

in Rwanda and Bosnia.
The Syrians are certainly aware that Israel gave up its early-warning
23.
station in Sinai, at Umm Khashiba, moving all its facilities into the Negev. Now,
some 16 years after the Treaty of Peace, March 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel, 18 I.L.M.
362 [hereinafter Peace Treaty-1979], the Syrians do not want to settle for less

than did the Egyptians.
See Dore Gold, Forewarned is Forearmed, JERUSALEM Posr,
24.
INTERNATIONAL EDMON, July 29, 1995, at 7.
See generally iU. (discussing and evaluating Israel's security options).
25.
Id. (providing a visual aid for understanding the terrain).
26.
Id.
27.
Cf. id. (demonstrating why various alternatives fall short of Israeli
28.
national security needs).
See Uc.
29.
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hostile regimes. United States forces probably would be drawn
into both inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli disputes.

Soon thereafter,

the United States public would demand the return of its soldiers.
Further, Israel's military dependence upon the United States
would likely grow to unmanageable levels. Syria might come to
view such a strong U.S. presence as an affront to its own
sovereignty. In that event, President Assad or his successor could
be expected to push for removal of U.S. forces, a demand similar
to Egypt's3 0 1967 demand for U.N. withdrawal from the
32
Sinai 3 l-the demand that led to the Six-Day War.
For these reasons, as well as the aforementioned liabilities of
early-warning systems in the hands of non-Israelis, a
demilitarized Golan could not assure Israel's basic security.
According to a recent statement by four retired Israeli generals,

Israel's presence on the Golan Heights constitutes the optimal
strategic balance with Syria and insurance against a massive

30.
Egypt, of course, entered into a formal treaty of peace with Israel in
1979. Peace Treaty-1979, supra note 23. Contrary to widespread belief, however,
and potentially pertinent to the present consideration of an Israel-Syria
agreement on disposition of the Golan, this treaty does not constrain Egypt from
joining other Arab states against the Jewish state. A minute to Article VI,
paragraph 5, of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty provides: "It is agreed to by the
Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other treaties or
agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty." Id.
Minute to Art. VI(5), 18 I.L.M. at 392.
31.
After the withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force, The Voice of the
Arabs proclaimed, on May 18, 1967, "As of today, there no longer exists an
international emergency force to protect Israel,. We shall exercise patience no
more. We shall not complain any more to the [U.N.] about Israel. The sole
method we shall apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the
extermination of Zionist existence." See ISI LEIBLER, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL 60
(1972) cited in MITCHELL G. BARD & JOEL HIMELFARB, MYTHS AND FACTS: A CONCISE

RECORD OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 62 (1992). Two days later, an enthusiastic
echo came from Hafez Assad, then Syria's Defense Minister and now the
President to whom Rabin would surrender the Golan Heights: "Our forces are now
entirely ready... to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist
presence in the Arab homeland .... The time has come to enter into a battle of
annihilation." Id.
32.
On May 15, 1967, Israel's 19th Independence Day, then Chief of Staff,
Lt General Yitzhak Rabin, now Prime Minister, forecast years of quiet for the
State of Israel. See CHAIM HERZOG, THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS 149 (1982) (recounting
chronological events). Only two days later, however, Egypt's President Nasser
proceeded to move large forces through Cairo en route to Sinai. Id. Within a few
days, by May 20, 1967, approximately 100,000 Egyptian troops, organized in 7
divisions, together with 1,000 tanks, were concentrated along Israel's
southwestern border. Id. On May 17th, Nasser demanded the withdrawal of the
United Nations Emergency Force, and the U.N. Secretary-General, U Thant,
acceded to the request two days later. Id. For an account of chronological events
from the perspective of the United Nations, see RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURrIY COUNCIL (1946-1989) at 446 (Karel C. Wellens ed.,
1990).
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Syrian attack.
The IDF's proximity to Damascus is also a
guarantee against a Syrian missile launch into Israel's rear. Any
change in this balance would lessen Israel's deterrent against
potential Syrian aggression and jeopardize the quiet and stability
that have characterized the Golan since 1 9 7 4 .33

As for the use of U.S. troops:
Involving [U.S.] troops on the Golan Heights, whether as "monitors"
or "peace keepers" or in some other role, would be a blunder. The
Golan Heights is entirely unlike the broad, empty Sinai Desert, in
currently participate in the Multinational Force
which [U.S. forces]
4
Organization.3

The Golan, which ranges up to a height of 2,300 feet,
dominates the Jordan Valley, the lowest point on earth. On this
strategic plateau, there are only two natural terrain bottlenecks.
The choke points are defensible. But, with the Golan in Syrian
hands, however "demilitarized," thousands of enemy tanks,
backed by missiles and aircraft, could still overrun Israel.3 5 This
could be the case even if, in the best case demilitarization
scenario, Israel were allowed to operate its3 6own early-warning
assets, which is a highly improbable scenario.
Finally, any Israeli agreement to Golan demilitarization would
be exceedingly problematic under Israeli law. In 1981, the

33.
STAIEMENr. ISRAELI (RES.) GENERALS VIEW SECURITY ISSUES (July 17,
1995) (prepared statement; copy on file with authors) [hereinafter STATEMENT].
This July 17, 1995 statement delivered at a Washington, D.C. conference was
signed by Major General (res.) Yehoshua Sagui, Admiral (res.) Micha Ram,
Brigadier General (res.) David Hagoel, and Brigadier General (res.) Aharon Levran.

Id. For further details concerning this conference, attended by retired U.S. and
Israeli generals, see U.S. and Israeli Military Experts Skeptical of High Tech
Solutions.forIsraeliSecurity, SECURrIY AFF., Aug./Sept. 1995, at 4.
34.
STAEMENT, supranote 33.
35.
Regarding Syria's overall military capability, Damascus possesses
more chemical warheads (primarily nerve gas) than any other state in the region.
Syria's Puzzling Drive, JERUSALEM POSr (International Edition), June 10, 1995, at
10 (editorial). Syria also maintains a sophisticated delivery system, including
Sohoi-22, Sohoi-24, and MiG-23 bombers designed to carry chemical bombs, and
100-200 warheads for Scud-B missiles. Id. Recently, Syria began to produce
long-range Scud-C missiles, and it may already have begun production of M-9
missiles, in cooperation with North Korea, Western, and Iranian sources. Id.
36.
See, for example, the statement by Major General (res.) Shlomo Gazit,
The Real Red Line, JERUSALEM PoSr (International Edition), June 17, 1995, at 12.
Gazit is the former Chief of the IDF Intelligence Branch and currently a senior
research fellow at Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.
According to Gazit, the threat of a Syrian military offensive can be overcome only
if "over the course of time, Israel maintains its absolute deterrent power, even
after an agreement is signed and implemented." Id. Further, another condition is
"the preservation of Israel's deterrent intelligence capability. As long as there are
no credible substitutes-airborne, satellite, or inside Israeli territory-we cannot
give up manning warning stations located on 'sovereign' Syrian soil." Id.
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Knesset 3 7 adopted a revised penal code. 38 Chapter 7, titled
"Security of the State, Foreign Relations and Official Secrets,"
includes paragraphs that were incorporated verbatim from earlier
revisions of the penal code adopted in 1957.39

Paragraph 97b

reads as follows: "Anyone who does something with the intention
of removing territory from the sovereignty of the state or making
that territory part of the sovereignty of a foreign state or has
performed an act that is likely to bring this about-the penalty is
death or life imprisonment." 4o
The Golan Plateau (unlike Judea and Samaria, which, except
for eastern Jerusalem and its environs, were never incorporated
into Israel) is an integral part of Israel's sovereign territory,
annexed by the Knesset on December 14, 1981. 4 1

The Law of

Ramat HaGolan, adopted on that date, says: "The law and
jurisdiction and administration of the state will apply to the
territory of Golan." 42 When certain Israeli opponents of the
annexation argued that application of Israeli law did not apply
sovereignty, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled against them.4 The
Court stated: "Wherever in the law it says Israel or the state of
Israel, Ramat HaGolan is included."44
Demilitarization, both of the emerging Palestinian state and
the Golan Heights, can never be consistent with Israel's
compelling security needs. From the standpoint of international
law,4 5 both expressions of demilitarization would cause great

37.
38.

The Knesset is Israel's parliament.
Rael Jean Isaac & Erich Isaac, Should None Dare Call It Treason?,

OUnXST, Dec. 1994, at 3, 4.

39.

Id.

40.

Id. This means, inter aia,that Rabin's intention to give up the Golan

to Syria could be in violation of Israeli law. See id. at 3-4. Moreover, in providing
the death penalty, in a state that has virtually no death penalty (except for Nazi
war criminals), Israeli law now recognizes such treason as the most serious of

transgressions.
41.
Id.at 4.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
From this jurisprudential standpoint, Israel always retains, inter alia,
as does every other state in world politics, the long-standing right of recourse to
anticipatory self-defense. On this right, see Louis Rene Beres & Yoash TsiddonChatto, Reconsidering Israel'sDestruction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, TEM.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. (forthcoming Fall 1995); Louis Rend Beres, Preservingthe Third
Temple: Israel's Right of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law, 26
VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 111 (1993); Louis Rene Beres, After the Gulf War Israel,
Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 HOUSr. J. INI'L L. 259 (1991); Louis
Rene Beres, Striking 'First":Israel'sPost Gulf War Options Under InternationalLaw,
14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, Israel and Anticipatory
Self-Defense, 8 ARIZ. J. INt & COMP. L. 89 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, After the
SCUD Attacks: Israe PalestineandAnticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. Rry.
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strategic difficulties for Israel. Recognizing this, it is now up to
the government of Israel to ensure that the security of the Jewish
state be protected by means other than demilitarization, primarily
by the refusal to enter into any further agreements that would
require surrender of Israeli territory to enemy populations.

71 (1992); Louis Ren6 Beres, Israel, Force and International Law: Assessing
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 JERUSALEM J. INT'LREL., No. 2, 1991, at 1; Louis Ren6
Beres, Striking Preemptively: Israel's Post Gulf War Options Under International
Law, in ARMS CONITROL WITHOUT GLASNOSI: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 129 (Avi Becker ed., 1993) (special publication of the Israel Council on
Foreign Relations).

